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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE
OF MR, ALLEN'S FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES
INASMUCH AS THOSE PURCHASES CONSTITUTED EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE
CHARACTER.

In its Brief, the State argues that the evidence of Mr.
Allen's fraudulent-credit purchases constituted intrinsic evidence
that does not implicate the purposes of Rule 404(b).
Appellee, pp. 21-22.

See Brief of

According to the State, the evidence of Mr.

Allen's fraud demonstrated his role in the conspiracy to commit
Id.

his wife's murder.

at

23-25.

Neither case law nor the

evidence presented during trial support the State's contentions.
In

support

furtherance

of

of
a

its

contention

conspiracy

are

that

not

acts

extrinsic

purposes of Rule 404(b), the State cites United
374 F.3d
Nichols,

959

(10th Cir. 2004).

Id.

committed
evidence

States

at p. 21.

v.

Nichols,

"Other act evidence is intrinsic when the evidence of the

intertwined

or both acts are part of a single

the other acts were necessary

v.

for

According to

inextricably-

other act and the evidence of the crime charged are

Nichols,

in

preliminaries

criminal

episode

to the crime

374 F.3d at 1007 (emphasis added) (quoting United

Lambert,

or

charged.
States

995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir.), 510 U.S. 926, 114

S.Ct. 333 (1993)).

7

In this case, the fraudulent credit-card purchases are not
inextricably intertwined with the alleged conspiracy to commit
murder.

Rather,

the

record

demonstrates

no

relationship

whatsoever between the fraudulent credit-card purchases and the
alleged

conspiracy

to

Furthermore,

other

Wright,1

State presented

the

than

commit
the

the

murder

self-serving
no evidence

of

testimony
that

credit-card purchases were part of the alleged
commit murder as a single criminal episode.

Jill

the

Allen.
of

Joey

fraudulent

conspiracy

to

In fact, other than

Wright's testimony, no evidence was presented that the credit-card
fraud was part of the alleged conspiracy to commit murder.

Wright

x

0n cross-examination, the following testimony was elicited from
Joey Wright about his willingness to lie about good friends:
COUNSEL: Now, in that regard, being a good friend of
yours doesn't always necessarily mean that you
won't cheat on your friend, correct?
WRIGHT:
That's correct.
COUNSEL: In fact, being Joey Wright's friend may mean
that Joey Wright will do what he can to get over
on a friend as well, correct?
WRIGHT:
That's correct.
COUNSEL: What do you mean by getting over on people?
WRIGHT:
Stealing from them. Taking from them.
COUNSEL: Lying to them?
WRIGHT:
That's correct.
COUNSEL: Lying about them, if necessary?
WRIGHT:
If it's to my advantage, yes.
*

*

* "k

COUNSEL:
WRIGHT:
COUNSEL:

You've lied before, Mr. Wright?
Yes, I have.
We don't know whether you will
correct, Mr. Wright?
WRIGHT:
It's true.
(R. 2053: 755-56; R. 2 053:758:5-9).

lie

again,

claimed that Mr. Allen told him about the fraudulent purchases but
neither Wright nor any of the alleged co-conspirators had any
involvement in the fraudulent credit-card purchases.
Finally, in light of State's inability to demonstrate any
nexus between the fraudulent credit-card purchases and the alleged
conspiracy to commit the murder, it failed to prove that the acts
of credit-card fraud were necessary preliminaries to the alleged
murder

conspiracy.

Consequently,

the

fraudulent

credit-card

purchases are extrinsic evidence and fall directly within the
scope of Rule 404(b).

See United

1149

(stating "intrinsic evidence" is evidence

(6th Cir. 1995)

States

v.

Barnes,

49 F.3d 1144,

"which is inextricably intertwined as 'an integral part of the
immediate context of the crime charged.'").
The
purchases

State's

argument

that

the

fraudulent

credit-card

are intrinsic evidence of the conspiracy to commit

murder is an attempt to bootstrap the unrelated fraudulent acts of
Mr. Allen to the conspiracy to commit murder.
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal

See 22 Charles Alan

Practice

& Procedure

§

5239, at 452 (1978) (warning that justifying the admissibility of
criminal transactions "on the ground that they were part of the
conspiracy" presents "a danger here of bootstrapping that will
completely undermine the policy of Rule 404(b)").

Simply because

the State argues that the fraudulent credit-card purchases were
9

part of the history of the conspiracy to commit murder is not an
adequate ground for the admission of other crimes evidence.
United
see

States

also

United

1998), aff'd,

v.

Sullivan,
States

919 F.2d 1403, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990);
v.

Arana,

182 F.R.D. 236, 240 (E.D. Mich.

51 Fed. Appx. 488 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,

1076, 123 S.Ct. 667 (2002).
purpose

See

for admission of

537 U.S.

The State must provide some probative
the

fraudulent

credit-card

purchase

evidence, which, for the previously discussed reasons, is wholly
lacking in the instant case.
A.

The

Sullivan,

919 F.2d at 1416.

The Evidence of Mr, Allen's Fraudulent Credit-Card
Purchases
Provided No Proof
of
the Monies
Allegedly Paid to Mr. Wright.

State's

argument

that

the

fraudulent

credit-card

purchases provided proof of Mr. Allen's role in the conspiracy to
commit murder by accounting for monies paid to Wright is not
supported by the record on appeal.

In the course of direct

examination, Wright testified that Mr. Allen paid him by way of
cash payments in various amounts over the course of several months
from April or May 1996 to approximately October of that same year
(R. 2053:610-621).

None of the dates or amounts provided by

Wright in his testimony even approximate the dates upon which the
fraudulent credit-card purchases occurred or the amounts of the

10

purchases. 2

See State's Exhibits G2 0 through G2 8 attached

as

Addendum E to the Brief of Appellant.
In the course of its motion in limine for the admission of
the

fraud

evidence,

the State

argued

that

the purpose

of

the

evidence of the fraudulent credit-card purchases was to show how
Mi

Allen

created

a scheme

to disguise

the

f ] ow

of n Lone y

to

Wright, and to corroborate Wright's testimony of a conspiracy (R.
589) .

However, as previously discussed,

connection

between

the

fraudulent

the record reveals 110

credit-card

purchases

and

scheme to disguise the alleged payment of monies to Wright,

a

The

State presented no evidence that Mr. A l l e n had reason to conceal
from anyone

the manner

in which he spent money.

Rather,

the

testimony at trial demonstrates that Jill Allen participated in at
least

one

eqi J i pment

of
(R

the

fraudulent

2058 11658-59) .

credit-card

purchases

of

golf

Furthermore, tv TO of the f raudulent

acts occurred after the murder

See State's Exhibits G2 6, G2 7,

ai id G28 attached as Addendum E to the Bi: i ef of Appel lant:,

2

Not only did none of the dates or amounts provided by Wright
correspond to the alleged payments from Mr. A l l e n , the State's
financial expert witness conceded that there was no "line by line
relationship" between the cash withdrawals by Mr. Allen and the
alleged payments to Wright (R. 2 0 5 6 : 2 - 1 2 ) .
11

B.

The Evidence of Mr. Allen's Fraudulent Credit-Card
Purchases
Provided
No Corroboration
of Mr.
Wright's Testimony.

At trial, Joey Wright testified that Mr. Allen had told him
that the money paid to him would be accounted for by purchases
with stolen credit cards (R. 2053:643:11-21).

However, the State

failed to make any connection between the fraudulent credit-card
purchases and the money allegedly paid to Wright.

In fact, the

State presented only a very small amount of the fraudulent creditcard evidence through the testimony of Joey Wright.

Rather, the

State elicited and emphasized evidence of Mr. Allen's fraudulent
credit-card transactions by way of the testimony from Sergeant
John Herndon of the North Salt Lake Police Department (See,

e.g.,

R. 2055:994-96) . The State then emphasized the fraudulent creditcard transactions by the introduction of documentary evidence (See
R.

2056:1208-11) .3

Those documents

or Exhibits

included

State's Exhibit G-20 through G-28;4 State's Exhibit G-29

the
(Cell

phone records showing calls from Mr. Allen's cell phone to The
Bombay Company); and

(State's Exhibit G-30

(Cell phone records

showing call from Mr. Allen's cell phone to Uinta Golf)).

3

The fraudulent credit-card transaction documents were presented
by way of overhead projector to the jury (R. 2 056:1211:15) .
4

A copy of State's Exhibits G-20 through G-30 are attached as
Addendum E to the Brief of Appellant.
12

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE
OF MR. ALLEN'S FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES
UNDER RULE 4 0 4 ( b ) .
Having

demonstrated

that

the

fraudulent credit-card transactions

evidence

of

Mr.

Allen's

is extrinsic evidence

that

falls directly within the rubric of Rule 404 (b) , the issue before
the Court

is whether ti le tr:i a ] coi :i i : t: abi ise :i :i ts d :i scretd c nfcn,r

admitting such evidence under Rule 4 04 (b) ,
whether

evidence

of

other

Prior to deciding

\ i : :>ngs , and bad acts

crimes

is

admissible under Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) , the State is correct that "the trial
COL, . .in ii s t
offered

first dete r mi ne

(1) \ , he t he r s i i c 1 i e v i d e i I c e

for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b),

i s b e :i ng
(2)

whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 4 02, and (3)
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403."
v. Decorso,

1999 UT 57

added); see also
P. 3d 1120.

State

State

120, 993 P. 2d 837 (italicized emphasis

v. Nelson-Waggoner,

2 00 0 UT 59, HHlo-zu, 6

The "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be

scrupi 11 ously examined by trial judges :i i i 11 le proper exercise of
that discretion."
11 i

t: 1 i • E

fraudulent

Decorso,

c < i) i i r s e

of

1999 UT 57 at 1fl8 (citation omitted).
r u ] i i ig

of

M i:

A lien's

credit-card transactions were admissible, the trial

coI 11 t: coi ieluded "that i.f 11 ie State's
anticipate,

t: 1 I a t: e ^;r i d e i i c e

e\ idence

the evidence would be relevant

comes

i i i 3,s t h 3)

for an appropriate

purpose and non-character purpose; that is, intent, preparation,
13

plan and knowledge." (italicized emphasis added)

(R. 2062:7:13-

16) .5 However, as demonstrated above, the State, in the course of
presenting

evidence

of

Mr.

Allen's

fraudulent

credit-card

transactions, failed to establish any connection between the fraud
and the alleged conspiracy to commit the murder of Jill Allen.
Consequently,

the

evidence

presented

by

the

State

of

the

fraudulent acts committed by Mr. Allen was not offered for a noncharacter purpose as required by Rule 404(b).
In its bench ruling, the trial court also concluded that the
State's fraud evidence was relevant "to showing the conspiracy
element as some evidence supportive of the agreement to commit
murder."
Allen's

(R. 2062:8:1-4).
criminal

and

However, the State's evidence of Mr.

fraudulent

acts

does

not

satisfy

the

requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 402. According to Rule 402,
"[ejvidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
Evid.

402.

"'Relevant

evidence'

means

evidence

Utah R.

having

any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 4 01.

"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some
fact

that

is material

to

the

5

crime

charged--other

than

the

The trial court's bench ruling is attached as Addendum D to the
Brief of Appellant.
14

defendant's propensity to con u i: d t: crime.'"
66,

i[56, 52 P.3d

1210.

State

v. Bli iff

In light of the State's

2002 UT

failure to

demonstrate any connection between the fraudulent transactions and
the alleged conspiracy to commit murder, the evidence of Mr.
Allen's fraudulent credit-card purchases did not tend to prove
some fact that is material to the charged conspiracy to commit
Jill

Allen's

fraudulent

murder.

credit-card

Instead,

the

purchases

record

evidence

demonstrates

of

that

the

those

fraudulent acts were anything but an integral part of the alleged
conspiracy !:: : • ::c: >i i n i i:i t n n irder.

Ill, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT THE REQUISITE
BALANCING TEST UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403
PRIOR TO ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF MR. ALLEN'S
FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES.
"Finally, the trial court must determine whether the bad acts
evidence meets the requirements of rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence."

State

v. Nelson-Waggoner,

2000 UT 59, f206 P. 3d 1120.

"Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence
substantially
confusion

outweighed
the

considerations

of

by

issues,
undue

the
or

delay,

x

if its probative va] ile :is

danger

of

mislead \r-:
waste

present at ioi i of ci m: i: n :i ] at: ve evi dence . ' "

unfair
;

-.

-iry,

time,

or

State

60, f41, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403).
Shickles,

prejudice,
by

needless

\ , Wxdd isonf
In State v.

760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995), this Court stated:
15

or

2 00] I JT

In deciding whether the danger of unfair
prejudice
and
the
like
substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must
be
considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to
the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
Id.

at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick

on Evidence

§ 190, at

565 (3d ed. 1984) (emphasis added)).
Contrary to the State's bald assertions, the trial court
failed to perform the requisite balancing under Utah Rule of
Evidence 403 prior to admitting evidence of the fraudulent creditcard purchases by Mr. Allen.

Without any real consideration of

the matters to be considered in the course of performing a Rule
403 balancing, the trial court essentially concluded that the
probative

value

outweighed

by

of

the

prejudice

fraud
(R.

evidence

was

2062:8-9). 6

not
This

substantially
unsupported

conclusion is of critical importance because it unduly restricted
the scope and applicability of the requisite Rule 403 balancing.
See United

States

v.

Zabaneh,

837 F.2d

1249

(5th Cir. 1988)

(providing detailed analysis of trial court's failure to perform
Rule 403 balancing).
6

The trial court's bench ruling and Rule 4 03 analysis, or lack
thereof, is attached as Addendum D to the Brief of Appellant.
16

The

i: ecoi c:I ] acks

ai r ' indication

performed the required balancing test.

thai

:

;

•

;

Further, the burden of

demonstrating that the balancing test favors admission lies on the
State.

Cf.

State

Without

evidence

v.

Banner,

that

the

111
trial

P.2d 1325, 1334
court

examined

(Utah 1986).
and

considered the various factors outlined by the Coi i :i : t: i n
the

trial

court

erred

in admitting

evidence

properly
Shickles,

of Mr. Allen's

fraudulent credit-card purchases.
Mr. Allen's acknowledgment that he committed the fraudulent
acts increased the ] ike 1 i 1 Iood t h a t t: 1 Ie ji 11 \
fraudulent

acts

instead

of the State's

woi i.3 ci f o c u s oi i I: :i i s

burden

alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

of proving the

State

1999 UT 59, 1fl5, 992 P.2d 951 (citing In re Winship,
364,

90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970))

v.

Saunders,

397 U.S. 358,

This, in turn, increased the danger

that the jury felt that Mr. Allen should be punished for his acts
of fraud even if the evidence of his alleged involvement in the
conspiracy

to commit murder

is not beyond

a reasonable doiibt,

Consequently, the conclusiveness increased the likelihood that the
jury

woi i.1 d a i i :i d i ci convi c t

Mi :, A1 1 ei i b a s ed

o n 1 :i :i s e r :i i: ni na ]

character or propensity to commit bad acts.
The re we re i 10 s :i m :i ] arities bet we en the c i i i ne s ,

11 I f a c t: 11 le

State failed to establish any connection between the fraudulent
activity and the alleged conspiracy.
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Itoreover, the interval of

time factor and the lack of any corresponding relationship between
Mr. Allen's fraudulent acts and the alleged payments to Wright
demonstrate

the

low

or

nonexistent

probative

value

of

the

fraudulent credit-card transactions.
The trial court failed to consider, as a Rule 403 factor,
that

the

need

for

the

evidence

as well

as

the

efficacy

alternative proof was extremely low in the instant case.

of

Not only

did Joey Wright identify Mr. Allen as a co-conspirator in the
murder by testifying that he received numerous cash payments both
before and after the murder, but Joey Wright's spouse, Jenny
Wright, and Tony Taylor testified against Mr. Allen as well.
Consequently, the extremely prejudicial evidence of Mr. Allen's
fraudulent and criminal conduct was unnecessary to the State's
case, especially when considered in light of the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury based
solely on Mr. Allen's criminal character or propensity to commit
bad acts.
Two concerns are expressed by the first sentence of Rule
404(b) :

First, that the jury may convict a defendant as a " x bad

man' who deserved to be punished -- not because he is guilty of
the

crime

charged

but

because

of

his

prior

or

subsequent

misdeeds;" and second, "that the jury will infer that because the
accused committed other crimes, he probably committed the crime
18

charged."

United

1979); see

also

States
Saunders,

v

Phillips,

599 F.2d 1 34, 1 3 6 (6tl i C: i i:

1999 UT 59 at fl5.

''Because x[e]vidence of prior criminal acts is almost always
prejudicial to the defendant,' the use of such evidence must be
carefully

circumscribed

prejudice."
Cir.

United

States

1990) (quoting United

(10th Ci I. ] 984)).

to protect
v.

Sullivan,

States

v.

the defendant

from

unfair

919 F.2d 1403, 1416 (10th
Shephard,

739 F.2d 510, 513

Three types of prejudice, at the very least,

arise from the admission of other crimes evidence such as the
fraudulent credit-card pi ir chases :i i I t:l u E :i i is t ant case
P e t e r s o n , 696 P.2d 3 8 7 , 393 (Kan. 1 9 8 5 ) .

Stat e i;

"First, a jury might

well e x a g g e r a t e the v a l u e of the other crime[sI

. . . as evidence

inferring that, b e c a u s e a defendant h a s committed a similar crime
b e f o r e , it c a n b e c o n c l u d e d that h e c o m m i t t e d this o n e . "
Id.

"Second, t h e jury might conclude that t h e defendant d e s e r v e s

p u n i s h m e n t b e c a u s e h e h a s b e e n a w r o n g d o e r i n t h e past even w h e r e
the m o v i n g p a r t y h a s failed t o e s t a b l i s h by the p r o p e r b u r d e n of
proof that t h e defendant h a s committed t h e act f o r w h i c h h e is n o w
being tr:i ed • •

Id

"Th :i rd,

the jury might cone] ude that, because

of the defendant's past acts, the evidence on his behalf should
not be believed'
Here, the trial court, by not conducting the requisite Rule
403 balancing, failed to carefully circumscribe the State's use of
19

Mr.

Allen's

protect

Mr.

fraudulent
Allen

credit-card

from

unfair

transactions

prejudice.

in

order

to

Consequently,

as

specifically discussed above, the aforementioned three types of
prejudice resulted from the admission of the fraudulent credit card

transactions.

Empirical

research

demonstrates

that the

joinder of offenses is prejudicial towards the defendant.
Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder

Offenses:

A Review

of the Legal

of

and Psychological

Law and Hum. Behav. 339, 349 (1985).7

See

Criminal

Literature,

9

The applicability of this

research to other crimes evidence and Rule 404(b) is equally
efficacious.

According to the research, "Defendants are more

likely to be convicted on a given charge when that charge is tried
within the context of a joined rather than severed trial."
pp. 349-50.

Id.

at

"In general, there is evidence to show that jurors do

confuse and accumulate evidence and do draw criminal personality
inferences
empirical

in joined
research

Id.

trials."

generally

at p. 350.

demonstrates

that

Furthermore,
limiting

jury

instructions in joinder-of-offense situations do not influence
qualified jurors' judgments and tend to be ineffective.

See Sarah

Tanford, Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins, Decision

Making

7

A copy of Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder

Criminal

Offenses:

A

Review

of

the

Legal

and

in

of

Psychological

Literature,
9 Law and Hum. Behav. 339 (1985) is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
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Joined

Criminal

Evidence

Trials:

Similarity,

and Limiting

Behav. 319, pp. 333-34

IV.

The Influence

oi

Charge

Instructions,

Similarity,

9 Law and Hum.

(1985).8

THE
TRIA1. COURT
ABUSED
ITS
DISCRETION
BY
DETERMINING THAT THE "LIE DETECTOR" REFERENCE WAS
INNOCUOUS AND THEREBY DENYING THE FIRST MOTION FOR
A MISTRIAL.

The State argues that the trial court correctly found that
the

u

lie detector"9 reference d :i c:I i lot p r e j u d i ce Mi

therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
the f:i rst motion lui .i mistrial.

-See Br lef of Appellee, pp. 31-

By so arguing, the State asserts that State

37.

v.

Eldredge,

773

P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), is inapposite to the instant case.
In State

v.

Eldredge,

773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), this Court, in

the course of addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence,
acknowledged the insufficient reliability of polygraph data aiid
the tendency for the fact finder to be overawed by such.
37.

Id,

at

The unreliable nature of polygraph evidence arid :i ts tendency
8

A copy of Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins,

Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials:
The Influence
Similarity,
Evidence Similarity,
and Limiting Instructions,

of Charge
9 Law and

Hum. Behav. 319 (1985) is attached hereto as Addendum B.
9

The term "lie detector" is arguably more egregious than
"polygraph". This is especially true in the instant case where the
testimony of Wright prior to the initial "lie detector" reference
involved allegati ons that he and Mi". Allen had "faked" their
conversations over the telephone, "talking of our innocence." (R.
2053 :644-45) .
21

to result in the abdication by the fact finder of its truthfinding

function

is

directly

relevant

to

the

instant

case.

Moreover, the "lie detector" references, without any polygraph
results or explanation as to why the results of such an exam were
not admitted, are more egregious.
The "lie detector" reference by the State's star witness,
Joey Wright, allowed the jury to speculate about why the results
of Mr. Allen's supposed polygraph examination were not placed into
evidence or even discussed at trial.

This in turn allowed the

jury to conclude that Mr. Allen was trying to hide the negative
results of the "lie detector" test.
The "lie detector" reference by Joey Wright was exacerbated
by the prosecutorial misconduct of allowing the comment to be
brought to the attention of the jury a matter that it would not
be justified in considering in determining its verdict.
v.

Kohl,

2000 UT 35, 1J22, 999 P. 2d 7 (quoting State

961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) .

v.

See

State

Longshaw,

The State knew that the

police had requested that Mr. Allen take a polygraph examination.10
Rather

than

reference,

take
the

precautions

State

allowed

to
and

10

prevent

the

arguably

"lie

elicited

detector"
the

lie

The prosecutor, in the course of preparing for Joey Wright's
testimony at trial, met with him on more than six occasions (R.
2 053:659:2-5). Consequently, the prosecutor had a good understanding
of Wright's testimony and presumably the answer elicited (R.
2053:659-60) .
22

detector reference, which, in turn, allowed the jury to abdicate
its all-important and difficult truth finding function.11

V.

THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE LAW AND
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN THE
COURSE OF DENYING THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED
ON JUROR MISCONDUCT.

In its Brief, the State argues that the trial court correctly
denied the motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct
because the juror contact was not with a "court participant".
Brief of Appellee, p. 59-61.
to

take

into

account

See

The State's argument, however, fails
crucial

distinguishing

facts

and

circumstances.
Contrary to the State's assertion, the legal standard to be
applied in the instant case is set forth in State
P.2d

277

(Utah

1985),

in

which

this

Court

v. Pike,

articulated

712
the

following rule:
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises
from any unauthorized contact during a trial
between
witnesses,
attorneys
or
court
personnel and jurors which goes beyond a mere
incidental, unintended, brief contact . . . .
[W]hen the contact is more than incidental,
the burden is on the prosecution to prove
that
the unauthorized
contact
did not
influence the juror.

lx

The State's claims concerning inadequate briefing are without
merit in light of Utah case law and the applicable rule of appellate
procedure. See State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, %7, 1 P. 3d 1108 and
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) .
23

Id.

at 280/ see also,

Logan

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); cf.
P.3d 805 (quoting State
(citations omitted) ) .

City

v.

State
v.

Carlsen,

799 P. 2d 224, 225-26

v. Martin,

2002 UT 34, f45, 44

James,

819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)

For all intents and purposes, the contact

that served as the basis for the motion for a new trial occurred
between

the juror and Ms. Camille Mauerhan.

Although

press

reports and spouses were the mediums through which the information
traveled, the contact substantially amounted to improper contact
between the juror, a witness, and counsel.

Consequently, this

case does not present the innocuous contact between a juror and an
outsider as the State would have this Court believe.

The contact

involved testimony and assertions of interested parties.
This distinction is particularly important in the instant
case because first, jury taint is nearly impossible to prove or,
in other words, "improper contacts may influence a juror in ways
he or she may not even be able to recognize."
Anderson,

65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 943 (1925); State v.

672 P. 2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983) .
judicial

See State

proceedings

such

appearance of impropriety.

as

Velasquez,

Second, there exists a need in

the

See State

24

v.

instant

case

v. Durand,

to

avoid

the

569 P.2d 1107,

1109 (Utah 1977); Glazier

v.

Cram,

71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188, 190

(1928) .12

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Allen respectfully asks that this
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the district
court together with any necessary instructions deemed appropriate.
Mr. Allen further requests that this Court grant him any further
relief

the

Court

deems

just

and

appropriate

under

the

circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

JjL

day of October, 2004.
SINS, P.C.

r

r& /fojj^lSefendant

12

The State did not address the cumulative error argument set
forth on pages 41 through 42 of the Brief of Appellant. Contrary to
the State's assertion, this case is particularly appropriate for
consideration under the cumulative error doctrine.
25
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Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985

Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of
the Legal and Psychological Literature*
Kenneth S. Bordenst and Irwin A. Horowitz$

Criminal courts routinely allow a defendant to be tried for multiple charges in a single trial. The
practice is known as joinder of offenses. The issue of joinder of offenses is examined from a legal
and psychological perspective. Relevant court decisions and their implications are discussed. In addition, the recent research conducted by social scientists concerning the possible reasons for the
prejudicial effects of joinder of offenses is critically reviewed. Suggestions are offered, based upon
previous joinder research, for the direction of future research into the loci of the effect and into
potential remedies.

INTRODUCTION
A number of recent studies of legal issues by social psychologists have demonstrated that joining of criminal offenses results in a bias against the defendant.
Specifically, the research indicates that the defendant is more likely to be found
guilty in a joined trial as compared to separate trials on each offense (Horowitz,
Bordens, & Feldman, 1980; Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983;
Tanford, 1983).
There are two competing interests at play relating to joinder of offenses:
Saving the time and the expense involved in separate trials, and the interest of
the defendant in obtaining a fair, unbiased trial. Because of the conflicting interests, compromises must be reached. Most often these compromises favor judicial
efficiency. The impact of joinder of offenses is mitigated by the fact that concurrent sentences are often meted out for any multiple convictions. Presumably, the
* This paper is an elaboration of one presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences, Chicago, March 1984.
t Department of Psychological Sciences, Indiana University—Purdue University, 2101 Coliseum
Boulevard East, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46805.
t Department of Psychology, University of Toledo, 2801 W. Bancroft St., Toledo, Ohio 43606.
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court's interests are served by saving time and expense and the defendant's by
meting out the concurrent sentences.
The interest expressed by both the courts and social scientists suggests that
the issue of joinder of offenses is of great importance on a thoretical and practical
level. This paper has three objectives: (1) to review and evaluate the legal rules
underlying the joinder of criminal offenses; (2) to review and critically analyze
the psychological literature, both theoretical and empirical, relating to the
"joinder effect"; and (3) to suggest the direction for future joinder research with
respect of both the locus of the effect and possible remedies.
Joinder of Offenses: Legal Background
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the requirements
for joinder of offenses or defendants in the same indictment or information
(Georgetown, 1983). Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the prosecution may join multiple offenses if they are of the same or similar
character, are based upon the same transaction, or are based upon the same
transactions constituting part of a common pattern of behavior. It should be noted
that many state statutes concerning joinder are patterned after the federal rule.
The rule allowing for joinder of offenses seems to have evolved from a concern over judicial economy. Rule 8 appears to balance the prejudice inherent in
joined trials against the benefits of judicial economy. However, the dominant
theme of the rule is the issue of judicial economy. By combining several charges
into a single proceeding the court saves the time and expense of seating several
juries and tying up valuable court time (Harder, 1982). In practice, the beneficiary
of the joinder rules is the prosecution. Not only can the prosecution economize
by preparing only one trial, but may also benefit by the possibility of obtaining
more convictions. In any event, the defendant's rights appear to be subordinate
to judicial economy.
An alternative view of the evolution of joinder rules is provided by Nowak
and Key (1982). According to Nowak and Key, joining of criminal offenses served
the purpose of protecting the defendant against being charged serially on a number
of related offenses. In response to concerns over multiple convictions several
state legislatures have enacted statutes prohibiting multiple convictions or consecutive sentences for a single criminal episode (Nowak and Key, 1982).
Improper Joinder and Severance
Generally speaking, the trial judge has wide discretion when joinder issues
are considered. The defense may make a pretrial motion to have charges separated (severance). The law does provide for severance of offenses when joinder
would be inherently prejudicial (Georgetown, 1983).
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if either
the defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder the trial court may grant
a motion to sever the offenses. In considering a pretrial motion to sever the trial
judge must weigh the competing interests of possible prejudice to the defendant
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and the public interest in avoiding possibly redundant separate trials (Georgetown, 1983).
The courts are cognizant of the possible prejudicial effects of joinder but feel
that equity is restored by meting out concurrent sentences for convictions arising
out of joined offenses. The court has also found some consolation in the fact that
a judicial instruction is delivered to jurors to keep joined charges separate and
arrive at independent verdicts. Consequently, the court often tips the scales in
the favor of the prosecution and denies a pretrial motion to sever offenses.
If the trial judge denies a motion to sever and conviction occurs, the defendant has the right to appeal on the basis of misjoinder. In the appeal the burden
of proof is on the defendant to show that joinder of offenses led to actual prejudice. In practice, the Appellate Court presumes that joinder was proper unless
the defendant demonstrates that the joinder was based upon bad faith on the part
of the prosecution or that the law was misinterpreted (United States v. Marzalkowski, 1982). All possible prejudicial risks, including the possibility of evidentiary spillover from one charge to the other(s) or the implication of a criminal
personality, are weighed against judicial economy.
Interestingly, Appellate Courts require that the defendant demonstrate that
the trial judge abused his discretionary powers when joinder was allowed. It is
not sufficient that the defendant show that conviction would have been much less
likely had the charges been severed (United States v. Thomas, 1982). Generally,
if the evidence presented at the joined trial would have been admissible in the
severed cases misjoinder is treated as "harmless error'1 (Georgetown, 1983).
The discretionary powers given to the trial courts are rarely challenged by
appellate courts. In practice reversals of convictions for failure to grant severance
are rare (Loh, 1984). Indeed, reversal seems to require not only "inherent prejudice" but egregious prejudice. For example, in People v. Shapiro (1980), the
appellate court held that joining the first indictment (64 counts of homosexual
sodomitic acts) with two others (promoting prostitution and other sexual offenses)
made conviction more likely based upon the assumption of criminal propensity
(Loh, 1984). In this rare case the Appellate Court held that joining the first indictment with the other two raised the probability of improper conviction.
Clearly, the defendant is at a disadvantage when the issue of joinder of offenses arises. Trial courts are hesitant to grant motions to sever and Appellate
Courts rarely challenge the decision made at the trial court level. Only in those
cases where joinder leads to obvious and flagrant prejudice will the courts grant
a motion to sever offenses or an appeal based on misjoinder.

The Court's Concern Over Joinder
In Drew v. United States (1964) the court noted that the defendant could be
prejudiced in several ways: the defendant may be confounded in presenting separate defenses, the jury might utilize evidence of one crime to infer a criminal
disposition, or the jury might cumulate the evidence of the various crimes
charged.
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The leading case on joinder is U.S. v. Foutz (1976). The court mirrored the
concerns expressed in the Drew decision by specifying the same sources of possible prejudice. In Foutz, the court went a step further in its reasoning and considered the possible impact and confounding of the evidentiary strength of each
charge. In discussing the facts in Foutz, the court suggested that the jury likely
had found the defendant guilty on the second, strong charge, and then inferred
that as Foutz had commited robbery once, it was likely that he committed a
robbery a second time. The result was that Foutz was convicted of both the strong
second charge and the weaker first charge (Tanford, 1983).
One method, as noted above, that the court system has used to eliminate the
problem of joinder is to admonish the jury, through an instruction of law, to keep
the evidence from each charge separate and reach independent verdicts. The
Foutz court was not impressed with the efficacy of these instructions. The judges
did not think that the standard juridic instructions were sufficient to eliminate the
inherent prejudice arising from joinder. The instructions did not, in the court's
view, exclude the possibility of intercharge confusion of evidence (Tanford, 1983).
The court felt, at least in the Foutz case, that joinder was a prosecutorial convenience yielding increased convictions.
Baron (1977) strongly recommends that multiple offenses only be joined if
they arise out of a single criminal episode. However, "single criminal episode"
appears to be an elusive concept. Courts have the discretion of defining a single
criminal episode by focusing on the defendant's animus, or upon the interval
between various criminal acts (Nowak and Key, 1982).
Despite the concern expressed by Baron and the Appellate courts, the practice of joinder is widespread. The courts have not provided a concrete solution
to the problems inherent in joining offenses. Perhaps empirical data generated
from research will help the courts adequately deal with the problem. The lack of
precision in the state statutes along with various court rulings have, in essence,
given courts plenary discretion in determining joinder.
Clearly, there are definitional and discretionary issues to be addressed by
the legislatures. The role that behavioral scientists may play in this process is to
offer crystalized advice to jurists as to (1) the prejudicial effects of joinder, (2)
the psychological loci of the joinder effect, and (3) empirically based remedies
for those circumstances in which the prejudicial effects of joinder are clear.
It should be noted that while this paper is concerned with the effects of
criminal joinder, parallel problems exist within civil law. Class action suits combine various cases into one proceeding. Federal rule 42 specifies the parameters
of the consolidation of civil cases. Again, in this instance, courts, special masters,
and settlement judges are given what amounts to plenary powers. While civil
joinder has special concerns and parameters of its own, the joinder effect should
not be seen as limited to criminal cases.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to reviewing the current psychological literature relating to the joinder effect. Whether the effect can be demonstrated empirically, the locus of the effect and possible solutions based on the
research are issues that will be discussed in separate sections below.
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Joinder Research
Two of the earliest research investigations of the joinder phenomenon were
conducted by Kerr and Sawyers (1979) and Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman
(1980). Both studies clearly show that the practice of joining offenses leads to a
bias against the defendant. Kerr and Sawyers (1979) had introductory psychology
students read a brief summary of a criminal trial in which a defendant was charged
with two offenses (robbery and receiving stolen property). Kerr and Sawyers
varied the strength of the evidence on each charge (evidence either strongly or
weakly linked the defendant with either crime), and the order in which the cases
were judged by the subjects (the order in which the cases were presented was
held constant). Kerr and Sawyers found that when the robbery case was adjudicated first its strength significantly affected the manner in which the receiving
stolen property case was judged. When the robbery case was strong the probability of conviction on the receiving stolen property case was lower than if the
robbery case was weak. Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman (1980) had simulated
jurors listen to an audiotaped summary of either joined or severed rape cases. In
this study the strength of the evidence of the cases to be judged (clear for the
prosecution or close) was varied along with the joined/severed trial mode.
Horowitz et al. obtained a joinder effect for those cases presented in the first
ordinal position in the joined trials. Comparisons between the first cases from
joined trials with their severed counterparts showed that a defendant was rated
as more guilty in the joined than severed trials. The joinder effect held regardless
of the strength of the first or second cases. No effect of joinder was found for
cases in the second position.
The Kerr and Sawyers (1979) and Horowitz et al. (1980) studies demonstrated
that the concern expressed by the court in the U.S. v. Foutz are well founded.
In fact, joining criminal offenses into a single trial proceeding leads to an increased
chance that the defendant will be convicted on at least one of the charges.
Several recent studies have empirically verified the prejudicial effect of
joinder or criminal offenses (Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983;
Greene & Loftus, 1983; Tanford, 1983). There exists a substantial body of research demonstrating that a defendant is at a disadvantage when joinder of offenses is allowed. It should be noted that the research on joinder has included
studies using a variety of subject types (actual jurors vs. students), methods
(deliberation vs. no deliberation), trial presentation modes (written, audiotaped,
videotaped), and measures (continuous vs. dichotomous). For example, Tanford
(1983) found that student jurors did not differ significantly from actual jurors and
that jury deliberation did not significantly affect the joinder phenomenon. The
various modes of presenting joined cases increases the confidence in the generalizability of the joinder effect. The data for the most part confirm the court's
reservations about the practice of joining criminal offenses that was expressed in
the U.S. v. Foutz. The questions that still need to be examined are those that
were brought up by the court regarding the mechanisms that underlie the biasing
effect of joinder of offenses.
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Loci of Prejudice in the Joinder Effect
In U.S. v. Foutz (1976) the court speculated as to the possible sources of
prejudice due to improper joinder of offenses. The Foutz decision specified four
sources of potential prejudice:
1. Confusion of evidence may occur since the jurors are hearing evidence
surrounding more than one offense.
2. Evidence may accumulate across multiple charges.
3. A defendant may be confounded in his attempt to mount a defense to the
multiple charges (e.g., if the defendant wishes to take the stand for one charge
but not another).
4. Because jurors are hearing evidence relating to more than one offense the
jurors may be led to an inference that the defendant has a criminal disposition.
In the following sections of the paper we will explore the research evidence
relating to three of these issues.
Confusion of Evidence
The court's notion of confusion of evidence raises questions about the ability
of jurors to keep the evidence from each isiultiple charge separate in memory.
The court's concern about intercase confusion of evidence relates to a classic
problem in psychology. The task facing a juror judging a joined trial is similar to
the one facing a subject in a memory experiment who is required to learn two
lists of words simultaneously and then recall items from one of the lists. The
juror adjudicating a joined trial must"learn" evidence from each charge and later
recall the evidence from each charge separately. In both instances there exists
the possibility that interlist (intercase) confusion will occur.
The theory of memory that best applies to the joinded trial situation is interference theory. According to interference theory when a person learns material
from two sources simultaneously intersource interference is likely to occur during
recall. This interference would be manifested by having items of information from
source 1 recalled as part of the recall of source 2 (and vice versa). Further,
according to the list differentiation hypothesis (Underwood, cited in Hulse, Deese
& Egeth, 1975), the more similar the information from the two sources the greater
will be the intersource confusion.
A similar process may operate when jurors must judge evidence from joined
cases. Since the court will only allow joinder if the crimes are of the same or
similar nature there may be a high degree of intercase evidentiary confusion. In
joined trials where evidence is drawn from the same conceptual categories (for
example, where both crimes are murders and the evidence from one may be
similar to the evidence from a second) the jurors may not be able to keep the
evidence from each charge separated in memory.
Researchers interested in the joinder effect have investigated the role of
memorial processes. For example, Tanford and Penrod (1982) had subjects recall
evidence from each case in a joined trial. Tanford and Penrod found that there
were intrusions from case to case on the measures of memory. They also found
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that the percentage of intrusions (items of evidence from one charge that were
incorrectly remembered as evidence from another charge) against the defendant
(antidefendant intrusions) was affected by the number of cases included in the
joined trial. There were also intrusions in favor of the defendant (prodefendant
intrusions) when cases were joined for trial.
Similarly, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) found that joinder of offenses leads
to intercase confusion of evidence. In their study, Bordens and Horowitz manipulated the strength of the cases judged (clear or close) as well as the similarity
of the joined charges (rape-rape or rape-murder). Consistent with interference
theory Bordens and Horowitz found that more confusion of evidence occurs when
the joined charges are similar as opposed to dissimilar. The effect of case similarity must be qualified since there was a significant charge similarity by strength
of second case interaction. When the charges were the same the rate of antidefendant intrusions was high regardless of the strength of the evidence for the
second charge. However, when the charges were dissimilar the rate of intrusions
was still high if the second case was clear for the prosecution (but not if it was
close). Confusion of evidence may occur even when the cases joined are not
highly similar.
It should be noted that not all of the joinder research has uncovered confusion
of evidence. Greene and Loftus (1983), using a recognition memory task, found
no significant confusion of evidence in their study. The lack of confusion of
evidence in the Greene and Loftus study might stem from the fact that subjects
read a brief summary of a case and then were administered a recognition task to
remember evidence. The relative paucity of evidence may have made the cases
easy to keep separated. Combined with the use of a sensitive measure of memory,
the relatively unrealistic simulation may have been insensitive to confusion effects.
The results from the Tanford and Penrod (1982) and Bordens and Horowitz
(1983) studies largely confirm the fear expressed by the Foutz court concerning
confusion of evidence. However, a critical issue still needs to be explored: Does
memory confusion influence the jurors' verdict?
Tanford and Penrod (1982) investigated the relationship between the degree
of evidence confusion (evaluated with an evidence recognition task) and guilt
judgments (a dichotomous guilty/not guilty measure) by correlating a difference
score of the pro- and antidefendant intrusions with final verdicts. The correlations
reported were small and nonsignificant. However, they were in the direction
expected if confusion of evidence is related to verdicts. Similarly, Tanford (1983),
Tanford and Penrod (1984), and Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) also report
low correlations between their measures of confusion and verdicts. Based upon
their research Tanford and her associates have concluded that confusion of evidence plays a minimal role in the joinder effect. In contrast, Bordens and
Horowitz (1983), using a free recall memory task and a continuous measure of
guilt judgment, found a significant moderate correlation between the transformed
(arcsin) percentage of antidefendant intrusions and guilt judgments. Their results
suggest that as the percentage of antidefendant intrusions increases so does the
perceived guilt of the defendant.
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The results of the series of studies reported by Tanford and her associates
and those reported by Bordens and Horowitz (1983) are in conflict. The conflict
between the Tanford studies and the Bordens and Horowitz may stem from at
least two sources: Different measures of memory and different dependent variables.
In the studies reported by Tanford and Penrod (1983) and Tanford, Penrod,
and Collins (1985) the measure of memory employed was a recognition task. In
contrast, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) used a free recall task. A juror may be
better able to recognize an item of evidence as not belonging to a particular case
than if the juror was required to freely recall evidence. The net effect would be
that few intrusions would result. In fact, Tanford (1983) reported that the frequency of intrusions was low and that there was little variability. The low variability in the memory measure may have contributed to an underestimation of
the relationship between memory and verdicts (Roscoe, 1974). Where Tanford
and her associates have used a free recall task to evaluate the impact of evidence
confusion they have calculated difference score (prodefendant-antidefendant intrusions) that was then correlated with verdicts. This method also showed little
or no correlation between evidentiary confusion and verdicts. However, the use
of the difference score may have led to an underestimation of the correlation. It
may be that such a difference score is unrelated to the raw percentages of antidefendant intrusions.
Additionally, all of the Tanford studies have used the dichotomous guilty/not
guilty verdict measure when attempting to correlate variables (e.g., memory) with
guilt judgments (Bordens and Horowitz used a continuous measure of guilt).
While the dichotomous measure does have high ecological validity the correlation
calculated between a continuous measure and dichotomous measure tends to be
conservative and to underestimate the degree of relationship between variables
(Stenner, 1969). Combined with the use of a recognition task or a difference score
the methods used by the Tanford studies may underestimate the degree of relationship between memory and guilt judgments.
It is interesting to note that in the research reported above there were very
few intrusions from one case to another in joined trials. This raises an interesting
question about a second aspect of evidentiary confusion. In all of the relevant
joinder research the problem of intrusions was approached from a quantitative
perspective (the number or percentage of intrusions). No study has directly addressed the qualitative nature of the intrusions. That is, were the intrusions observed of high or low probative value? One could certainly envision a situation
in which a single piece of evidence from one case intrudes on the memory of a
second and has a great effect on guilt judgments (e.g., a fingerprint on a gun).
Future research might address not only the issue of the quantity of the intrusions
but also the quality.
In summary, the available evidence lends support to the notion that jurors
may confuse the evidence from multiple charges in joined trials. However, the
research is equivocal on whether there is a strong relationship between measures
of confusion (intrusions) and guilt assessments. Owing to the methodological
differences between the major joinder studies it is not possible to clearly deter-
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mine what, if any, role evidentiary confusion plays in the joinder effect. Research
using ecologically valid measures of memory should be conducted to disentangle
the contradictory results that now exist.
Accumulation of Evidence
In the Foutz decision the court also expressed the concern that evidence
might accumulate across cases in a joined trial. In essence the court was concerned that the evidence from one case may serve to reinforce the evidence in
another. The concern is that a given piece (or pieces) of evidence within a particular case will be seen as strong if the case is placed within the context of a
joined trial rather than tried alone.
Tanford (1983) has found that joinder of offenses influenced subjects' ratings
of both prosecution and defense evidence. Juror-subjects were asked to rate the
evidence presented by the prosecution and defense on nine-point scales (1 =
strongly indicates innocence, 9 = strongly indicates guilt). Comparisons were
made between joined and severed versions of the cases. Tanford found that the
ratings of the prosecution evidence were higher in the joined than severed cases.
Also, the defense evidence was rated lower in the joined than severed cases.
Tanford's data then are consistent with the notion that jurors use evidence from
one case to reinforce the evidence from a second, thus accumulating the evidence
across cases.
Research reported by Bordens and Horowitz (1983) does not support the
data provided by Tanford (1983). Bordens and Horowitz asked subjects to write
down their "thoughts" about the case(s) heard. Those subjects were also asked
to rate the degree to which those thoughts favored either the prosecution or
defense. It might be predicted that if accumulation of evidence is taking place
across cases in a joined trial that the ratings of the cognitions associated with the
prosecution's case would be more favorable towards the prosecution in the joined
than severed cases. The results showed that joinder of offenses did not significantly affect the ratings of the antidefendant cognitions. Hence, these data do
not lend support to the notion that jurors accumulate evidence across cases in a
joined trial.
It is not possible to state clearly whether or not accumulation does occur
based upon these two studies. Both studies were carefully designed and executed.
However, certain differences were evident in the nature of the samples used in
the studies and the methodology. For example, Bordens and Horowitz had subjects rate their own thoughts about the cases and Tanford had subjects rate the
overall strength of the prosecution and defensive evidence as well as preselected
items of evidence. Since Bordens and Horowitz did not have subjects directly
assess the strength of evidence their data may not be a true test of accumulation
of evidence over joined trials. Additionally, the data reported by Tanford (1983)
and Bordens and Horowitz (1983) are not as disparate as they seem. Tanford
reported changes in the ratings of evidence as a function of joinder that were
significant but small in magnitude. Hence, if joinder does affect ratings of evidence its impact is small. Clearly, more research is indicated to help clarify the
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role of accumulation of evidence in joined trials. However, given the null findings
reported by Bordens and Horowitz and the small effect reported by Tanford
research into accumulation may prove to be less fruitful than research into other
causes for the joinder effect.
Inferences About the Character of The Defendant
In the U.S. vs. Foutz the court also expressed a concern that in joined trials
the jury would infer that the defendant has a criminal disposition based upon the
knowledge of the multiple charges. The court has expressed the concern that the
jury would develop a systematic bias against the defendant because of the multiple
charges. The mere knowledge of multiple charges may establish a perception of
consistency of behavior, thus making it easier to attribute the crimes to the defendant.
Two recent studies addressed the problem of jurors drawing an inference that
the defendant has a criminal personality (Tanford, 1983; Greene & Loftus, 1983).
Each of these studies shows that jurors do, in fact, infer that the defendant has
a criminal disposition when cases are joined as opposed to severed.
Greene and Loftus (1983) had juror-subjects rate a defendant tried for multiple offenses on three dimensions: dangerousness, likeableness, and believability.
Greene and Loftus found that when a defendant was tried for multiple offense in
a single trial he was seen as more dangerous, less likeable, and less believable
than a defendant tried on separate offenses. Hence, the jurors were likely to form
a different opinion of the defendant's character based upon the nature of the trial
(joined vs. severed).
Tanford (1983) also investigated the impact of joinder on inferences about the
defendant. Tanford had juror-subjects rate the defendant on 11 separate ninepoint rating scales representing different trait and behavioral dimensions (e.g.,
honest-dishonest, dangerous-not dangerous, future crime likely-future crime
not likely, typical criminal-not typical criminal). A factor analysis revealed two
major dimensions: criminality-credibility and a global evaluation factor. Tanford
analyzed these data by calculating factor scores for the two dimensions and
looking at how each was affected by joinder. It was found that subjects tended
to rate the defendant less favorably on the criminality-credibility and global
evaluation dimensions in the joined than severed trials. These data, according to
Tanford, "offer strong support for the prediction that joinder leads to negative
inferences about the defendant" (p. 44). Based upon the results of a path analysis,
Tanford concluded that the negative inferences generated about the defendant as
a result of joinder serve as a "criminal schema" that influences later judgments
of the evidence. The implication of Tanford's data is that the criminal schema is
activated relatively early in the judgment process and serves to influence how
evidence is perceived later in the judgment process.
Tanford's (1983) results, while intriguing, may not present an accurate picture
of the causal relationship between inferences of criminality and guilt judgments.
Tanford's study was not designed to experimentally test the causal relationship
between the formation of a "criminal schema" and guilt verdicts. Instead, a
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correlational path analytic approach in which ratings of the defendant's character
were obtained after verdicts were assigned was used. The dangers of using path
analysis to infer causality in situations similar to Tanford's study have been discussed by Spaeth (1975) and Kim and Kohout (1975). The temporal ordering of
judgments concerning the defendant and guilt cannot be clearly established from
Tanford's data. Tanford favors the idea that the "criminal schema" is formed
early which causes changes in how the evidence is perceived and the subsequent
judgment of guilt. However, it could as easily be argued that after assigning guilt
the subjects reasoned that the defendant had a criminal personality and reevaluated the evidence. Tanford does acknowledge the limitations of using the path
analysis and does use existing research on impression formation to support her
causal model. Such a strategy certainly provides an interesting base on which
future experimental tests of the criminal schema model could be built.
Additionally, there is little direct evidence on when the "criminal schema"
is activated. However, data reported by Tanford and Penrod (1982) suggest that
the schema is not activated until relatively late in the trial. Tanford and Penrod
had subjects provide a prior probability of the defendant's guilt based only on
knowledge of the nature of the charge(s). Tanford and Penrod found that joinder
of offenses did not significantly affect subjects' estimates that the defendant committed the crime(s). If, as Tanford (1983) suggests, the criminal schema is a key
(if only indirect) mediator of the joinder effect (rather than a by-product of it) it
might be expected that its impact would be seen as soon as the juror learns that
the defendant has been charged with multiple offenses and before any evidence
is presented.
Tanford's results, along with the results reported by Greene and Loftus,
provide an interesting starting point for further investigation of the problem of
the effects of criminal inferences about the defendant on guilt judgments. There
is enough social psychological theory and research (e.g., attribution theory) to
suggest a relationship between inferences about the defendant and guilt judgments. However, neither study clearly and unambiguously establishes a causal
link between such inferences of criminality and guilt judgments. Experiments
could easily be constructed that would directly test the impact of joinder on
inferences of criminality. For example, a study could be conducted in which guilt
ratings are obtained at various points in a joined trial (e.g., after finding out about
the multiple charges, after presenting the evidence from the first case, etc.). Such
research could address the issue of where in the judgment process the "criminal
schema" is developed and how it might affect the perception of the evidence.

SUMMARY
The empirical research has shown clearly that the practice of joinder of
offenses is prejudicial towards the defendant (although the magnitude of the
joinder effect is often small). Defendants are more likely to be convicted on a
given charge when that charge is tried within the context of a joined rather than
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severed trial. Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) have statistically combined
the results of seven experimental studies on joinder. Following Rosenthal (1978)
they computed an overall joinder effect for these studies and found a highly
significant result. The pattern across these studies indicates a very robust effect
of joinder of offenses. The research therefore demonstrates that the concerns of
the court expressed in the U.S. vs. Foutz are well founded. In general there is
evidence to show that jurors do confuse and accumulate evidence and do draw
criminal personality inferences in joined trials.
Still unclear is the exact model that describes the underlying mechanisms
that cause the joinder effect. The research reported by Bordens and Horowitz
(1983) favors a cognitive processing approach focusing on the manner in which
evidence is stored, manipulated and retrieved from memory. On the other hand
the research reported by Tanford and Penrod (1982) and Tanford (1983) favors a
more social psychological approach stressing the role of criminal inferences
drawn about the defendant and how they relate to judgments of guilt.
At this point in time, given the conflicting nature of the research evidence,
it is not possible to offer any concrete ideas on which of the court's concerns
over joinder is most valid. Each of the three sources of prejudice discussed above
has a firm base in psychological theory and research. Clearly more research
centering upon the issues discussed above is needed before we can state conclusively what the loci of the joinder effect might be.
Directions for Future Research on Joinder of Offenses
Whatever the mechanism underlying the joinder effect, it is clear that the
effect of joining multiple offenses in a single trial is a robust one and does increase
the likelihood of a defendant being found guilty. We feel confident that the joinder
effect is a valid reflection of the true state of affairs. The effect has been shown
in a variety of studies employing different techniques and subject populations.
Furthermore, while decision making is clearly dependent upon the context in
which it occurs, the simulated trial contexts and the requirements of human
decision making in the laboratory studies represent a reasonable approximation
of juror decision making in a courtroom setting.
As social scientists we would like to be able to offer the courts concrete
advice on how to attenuate the impact of joinder of offenses. Unfortunately, the
state of the research at the present time does not allow such advice. If, for
example, inferences of criminality mediate the joinder effect then all multiple
offense trials would be prejudicial to the defendant. This would be especially true
of those trials in which many charges are joined. On the other hand, if the major
factor contributing to the effect is confusion of evidence then a case management
approach (discussed briefly below) would seem to be the way to reduce the
prejudicial effects of joinder. Before any conclusions about possible remedies can
be made we need to isolate the loci of the joinder effect more clearly than is
currently the case.
Once the loci of the joinder effect have been identified further research could
focus on potential remedies to the prejudicial effect of joining multiple offenses.
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Research could focus on several areas: pretrial case management (including using
a bifurcated trial system), juror instructions and juror education.
There is a precedent, found in civil law, for considering the possibility of
creative pretrial case management. Complex, multitort cases have necessitated
innovative techniques to bring the issues before the bar. One such technique
involves the use of multiple and separate juries. Juries are impanneled in a mass
voir dire, hear common core issues, and then each jury is assigned to hear the
presentations of a few of the plaintiffs (Rosenberg, 1984). A similar procedure
could be used in the criminal arena. Multiple juries could be impanneled to hear
multiple cases. Multiple juries have, in fact, been used in very lengthy criminal
cases in lieu of granting a motion for severance. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit
Court in United States v. Hayes (1982) upheld a trial court's decision to impannel
multiple juries, each assigned to one of the defendants who were tried together.
The Circuit Court held that the dual jury guaranteed a fair trial while preserving
judicial economy. It may be that trial courts would find such multiple jury trials
to be permissible when the evidence is complicated or highly similar across multiple offenses. The duplication of trials would be avoided while the defendant's
rights would be protected.
In the area of judicial instructions, most of the existing research suggests
that limiting instructions have little effect on the joinder effect (e.g., Tanford and
Penrod, 1982). However, Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) have reported
that a carefully designed set of instructions may have an effect on joinder of
offenses under certain conditions. Future research could systematically focus on
the parameters of judicial instructions that would make them more effective in
reducing juror bias. If such instructions could be constructed they may reduce
joinder-related bias regardless of the locus of the effect.
Finally, in the area of pretrial juror education, research could focus on the
effectiveness of making the jurors aware of the importance of following judicial
instructions to keep the evidence from multiple charges separate and reach independent verdicts. Such an education could be made part of already existing
procedures (e.g., films, mild lectures concerning the role of the jury, etc.) used
to socialize jurors into the legal system. Such a remedy would be predicated on
the idea that forewarning jurors about the potential bias inherent in joinder would
help to eliminate the bias.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that research is needed in two areas: Further research on the loci
of the joinder effect is needed to resolve some of the conflicts in the present
literature. It is only after we understand the locus of the effect that we can begin
to offer the court concrete, crystalized advice on remedies. Also, research is
required to test the implications of various remedial steps. Major research questions should center around the impact of implementing the remedies and which
remedies are the most efficient (in terms of both judicial conservation and safe-
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guarding the rights of the defendant). Additionally, we would also be interested
in knowing if the proposed remedies create a host of new, previously nonexistent,
sources of bias. Ideally, a remedy should eliminate the joinder effect while not
creating any new problems for the judicial system.
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Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials:
The Influence of Charge Similarity,
Evidence Similarity, and
Limiting Instructions*
Sarah Tanford,t Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins^

The present research investigated decision-making processes in "'joined" trials of multiple offenses.
Subjects judged videotaped trials of three joined charges in a factorial design that varied charge
similarity, evidence similarity, and judges' instructions designed to reduce judgment biases; or judged
one of several charges presented individually. The results indicated that subjects were more likely to
convict a defendant in a joined trial than on the same charge tried by itself, particularly when the
charge was presented in the third position. Convictions were more frequent when joined charges were
similar, and judges' instructions significantly reduced conviction rates. Subjects judging joined trials
confused evidence among charges, rated the prosecution's evidence as stronger, and rated the defendent less favorably than subjects judging single trials. The findings were compared statistically to the
results of previous research, and it was concluded that increased convictions in joined trials are robust
effects.

INTRODUCTION
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule H(a). Joinder of Offenses. Two or more
offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies, or misdemeanors, or both, are
of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two
or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a common scheme
or plan.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 14. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. If it
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appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder of offenses . . . in
an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order
an election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance . . . or provide whatever other
relief justice requires.

The issue of "joinder of offenses" poses a problem for the courts, since
joining multiple charges as provided by FRCP Rule 8(a) may result in prejudice
to a defendant contemplated by Rule 14. Until recently, the bulk of our knowledge
about the nature of this prejudice came from a body of appellate court opinions
in which judges relied on "armchair psychology" to decide whether joinder was
or was not prejudicial in a particular case. Traditionally the courts have recognized
three potential sources of prejudice to a defendant in a joined trial: (1) confusion
of evidence among charges, (2) accumulation of evidence across charges and (3)
juror inferences about the defendant's "criminal disposition" (United States v.
Foutz, 1976).
Recently, however, psychological researchers have investigated the joinder
issue experimentally using written or audiotaped trial summaries. Bordens and
Horowitz (1983), Green and Loftus (1985), Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman
(1980), and Kerr and Sawyers (1979) all found that a defendant was more likely
to be convicted on a particular charge in a joined trial than on the same charge
tried alone, although Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980)
found that this effect occurred primarily for charges presented in the first rather
than the second position. Tanford and Penrod (1982) used trials containing a single
charge or two, three, or four joined offenses, and found that the probability of
conviction on a particular charge increased as a function of the number of charges
with which it was joined.
Empirical research on joinder also provides evidence pertaining to each of
the three legal theories of prejudice: confusion, accumulation, and criminal inference. Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Tanford and Penrod (1982) both found
that joinder led to recall intrusions of facts from one charge to another, supporting
the theory of confusion of evidence. However, Bordens and Horowitz found that
confusion was related to guilt judgments, whereas Tanford and Penrod found that
it was not. Tanford and Penrod found that subjects judging joined trials rated the
evidence as more incriminating than subjects judging a single trial, supporting an
accumulation of evidence process, whereas Bordens and Horowitz found that
ratings of thoughts generated against the defendant (a different measure of evidence strength) did not differ in joined and single conditions. However, both
Bordens and Horowitz and Tanford and Penrod found that perceptions of evidence
strength were strongly related to guilt judgments. Greene and Loftus (1985) and
Tanford and Penrod (1982) found that joinder led to unfavorable ratings of the
defendant's character, and that these ratings were strongly related to subjects'
guilt judgments.
The legal remedy for prejudicial joinder is an instruction given by the judge
at the end of the trial designed to alleviate potential biases. Tanford and Penrod
(1982) found that instructions to consider charges separately did not significantly
reduce convictions in joined trials, but they used a rather weak and artificial
instruction manipulation. Using a more realistic manipulation, Greene and Loftus
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(1985) found that the standard multiple-offense cautionary instruction used in
Washington State courts also failed to reduce conviction biases, regardless of
whether the instruction came at the start or the end of the trial.
Tanford and Penrod (1984) addressed the applied and theoretical limitations
of previous research on joinder in a study designed to (1) focus on the psychological mechanisms underlying joinder effects, (2) provide guidance to judges in
their decisions about when to join charges, and (3) maximize external validity in
order to enhance the study's applied significance. Previous studies used written
(Greene & Loftus, 1985; Kerr & Sawyers, 1979; Tanford & Penrod, 1982) or
audiotaped (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Horowitz et al., 1980) trial summaries
as stimulus materials, whereas Tanford and Penrod (1984) used videotaped trial
reenactments. All previous joinder research used undergraduate subjects,
whereas Tanford and Penrod used adults previously summoned for jury duty, twothirds of whom had actually served on one or more cases. Also unlike previous
researchers, Tanford and Penrod (1984) included group deliberation in their procedures. Qualified jurors judged a realistic videotaped trial containing a particular
4
'target" charge tried by itself or in a joined trial with two other offenses that
varied as a function of (1) charge similarity, (2) evidence similarity and (3) judges
instructions designed to alleviate joinder-induced biases. The instruction manipulation was stronger than the standard instruction employed by Greene and
Loftus (1985), and contained elements corresponding to each of the three legal
theories of prejudice.
The results indicated that (1) the probability of conviction on the target
charge (which was the same in all conditions) was higher in a joined trial than on
the same charge tried by itself, (2) convictions increased regardless of the similarity of the charges or the evidence in the joined charges, and (3) instructions
had no effect on conviction rates. In terms of the hypothesized sources of prejudice, Tanford and Penrod found that joinder led to (a) confusion of evidence on
a recognition task, (b) strengthened perceptions of prosecution evidence strength
and weakened perceptions of defense evidence strength, and (c) less favorable
impressions of the defendant on dimensions of criminality (as indexed by several
ratings by credibility and criminal tendency) and global evaluations (measured by
ratings of goodness, nervousness, dangerousness, and attractiveness). As in their
previous research (Tanford & Penrod, 1982), Tanford and Penrod (1984) found
that confusion was unrelated to verdicts, whereas defendant and evidence ratings
were related to verdicts, as well as to each other.
Based on social cognition research (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Higgins, Herman
& Zanna, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), Tanford and Penrod (1984) proposed a
single explanatory model to account for their findings, and tested the model
with path analytic techniques. The results suggested that the three processes of
confusion, accumulation, and criminal inference, as well as the inefficacy of
judges' instructions, can be interpreted in terms of impression formation processes (Asch, 1946; Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). Tanford and Penrod
intepreted their results as indicating that joinder fosters a negative impression of
the defendant that influences (1) memory for evidence (leading to confusion
among charges); (2) perceptions of the evidence, which may be distorted in a
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manner consistent with the impression (i.e., the prosecution evidence appears
stronger, the defense evidence weaker); and (3) inferences about the causes of
the defendant's behavior based on his criminal character. This process leads to
an impression of greater guilt in a joined trial which is quite resistant to change,
and therefore joinder increases conviction rates both with and without instructions (Tanford & Penrod, 1984).
Support for a similar idea in a related jury context was obtained by Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Mack, and Wrightsman (1981) and Pyszczynski and
Wrightsman (1981). Pyszczynski et al. argued that attorneys' opening statements
are crucial aspects of the trial, since they create thematic frameworks (Lingle &
Ostrom, 1980) or schemata (Barlett, 1932; Taylor & Crocker, 1981), which affect
the way in which subsequent trial evidence is evaluated. In two studies (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Mack, and Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman,
1981), opening statements were manipulated to create predispositions towards
guilt or innocence, and these predispositions had a strong effect on verdicts even
when the evidence did not support the opening statement. Additional evidence
for the importance of first impressions was obtained in a study by Kassin and
Wrightsman (1979), in which judges' instructions on reasonable doubt affected
verdicts when the instructions were presented at the start of the trial, but had no
effect when presented at the end of the trial.
Research on the effect of prior convictions has psychological implications
similar to those raised by the joinder issue. A number of studies have found that
when evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record is introduced, subjects are
more likely to convict the defendant (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973; Hans & Doob,
1976; Sealy & Cornish, 1973; Wissler & Saks, 1985). Legally, evidence of prior
convictions is sometimes admissible when witness credibility is at issue, but jurors are not to use the information to decide guilt. However, in the above studies,
limiting instructions to use the record information to judge credibility but not guilt
were ineffective. Moveover, Wissler and Saks (1985) found that prior record did
not affect credibility assessments, although it did influence guilt judgments. Prior
convictions could operate psychologically in a manner similar to multiple charges,
since both suggest that the defendant has been involved in other crimes. In either
case, jurors may form an unfavorable impression of the defendant, which influences the way they process other trial information.
Conflicts in Existing Research
The joinder research reviewed above strongly indicates that joinder can influence judgments, but there are a number of inconsistencies among different
studies. First, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980) found that
joinder primarily increased convictions on the first, rather than the second, of
two charges; whereas Greene and Loftus (1985), Kerr and Sawyers (1979), and
Tanford and Penrod (1982) found that joinder increased convictions regardless of
charge position. A potential explanation for this discrepancy is the strength of
the cases used, although a direct comparison of case strength across studies is
not possible since different researchers employed different measures of conviction
rate. However, it appears that Bordens and Horowitz and Horowitz et al. used
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stronger cases than those used by other researchers. The mean conviction rate
obtained on nonjoined cases was 4.01 in the Bordens and Horowitz study and
4.0 in the Horowitz et al. study, measured on six-point scales where points 4, 5,
and 6 represented degrees of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (all three points
were labeled guilty verdicts). Tanford and Penrod (1982) used much weaker cases,
obtaining approximately 10% convictions across several nonjoined cases. Greene
and Loftus obtained ''conviction scores" ranging from 29% to 43% on severed
cases. However, conviction was defined as ratings of 5, 6, and 7 on a 7-point
scale, indicating that the defendant was either possibly (5), probably (6), or definitely (7) guilty, so these ratings are probably higher than would have been obtained if subjects were asked whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in a criminal trial. Thus it appears that
Greene and Loftus also used relatively weak cases. Additional evidence that
joinder effects are strong when cases are weak was obtained by Kerr and Sawyers
(1979), who found that joinder increased convictions on a weak robbery charge
(with a 25% conviction rate when it was not joined) but not a strong one (75%
nonjoined convictions).
Greene and Loftus (1985) interpreted their finding of increased convictions
on charges in either position as suggesting that the biasing effects of joinder occur
at the time the verdict is reached. If the effect occurred instead during the processing of trial information, Greene and Loftus argue that a "spillover effect" of
evidence from the first to the second joined charge should increase convictions
on the second charge, relative to the first. However, Greene and Loftus also
found that joinder led to negative impressions of the defendant, so their research
lends itself equally well to an impression-based interpretation such as the one
proposed by Tanford and Penrod (1984). If the impresson is formed at the
outset of the trial, it should influence processing of information from both joined
charges. The present research investigates this issue further by examining judgments on a number of different joined charges in the first, second, and third
positions.
A second discrepancy between studies is the relationship between memory
and verdicts. Tanford and Penrod (1982) obtained a nonsignificant positive correlation between free recall intrusions and verdicts (mean r = .16), and Tanford
and Penrod (1984) obtained a zero correlation between recognition intrusions
and verdicts. Bordens and Horowitz (1983) found that free recall intrusions
against, but not in favor of, the defendant were significantly related to convictions
(r values not provided). Research on memory-judgment relationships in other
domains indicates that memory for specific items of information is not strongly
related to overall impressions (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, &
Hastie, 1979; Riskey, 1979). Bordens and Horowitz do not describe their recall
task in detail, but it is possible that the task was structured in a manner conducive
to recall of judgment-relevant information, particularly against the defendant
(which should be more relevant to guilt determinations). However, the reasons
for the discrepancies between memory-judgment relationships obtained in existing research are far from clear, and the present research explores this issue
further.
A third discrepancy concerns the effects of joinder on perceptions of the
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evidence. Tanford and Penrod (1982, 1984) found that joinder increased subjects' perceptions of evidence strength, measured on scales from weak to strong
as well as innocence to guilt. On the other hand, Bordens and Horowitz found
that ratings of the favorableness of subject-generated thoughts against the defendant did not differ in joined and single trials, although subjects did generate more
antidefendant thoughts when charges were joined. The rating method used by
Bordens and Horowitz may not have measured subjects' perceptions of evidence
strength directly; and, as noted earlier, Bordens and Horowitz employed cases
with stronger evidence to begin with, so there may have been less room for an
increase in perceptions of its strength. The present research examines the effects
of joinder on multiple measures of evidence strength.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH
The objective of the present research was to extend the findings of Tanford
and Penrod (1984), and to resolve conflicting findings obtained by other researchers. Tanford and Penrod (1984) obtained significant joinder effects using
representative jurors in a realistic trial setting including group deliberation. However, as a result of the effort to achieve a high degree of external validity, Tanford
and Penrod did not have sufficient resources to examine a complete factorial
design, and in every instance jurors' judgments were on a particular "target"
charge that came first in the joined sequence. The present study replicated the
conditions employed by Tanford and Penrod (1984) using undergraduates who did
not deliberate, and included a number of additional experimental conditions to
produce a more complete design.
The study used a full factorial design manipulating charge similarity, evidence
similarity, and judges' instructions. From an applied standpoint, similarity was
considered an important variable because it is a criterion currently used by the
courts as a basis for joinder decisions. From a theoretical perspective, similarity
was predicted to influence the three processes of confusion, accumulation, and
criminal inference. Although previous research demonstrates that joinder instructions (Greene & Loftus, 1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1984) as well as judges' instructions in other domains (Lind, 1982) tend not to be effective, the legal presumption
is that instructions will work; thus the instruction issue continues to be an important one. The present research investigated the possibility that a strong and
carefully constructed instruction that did not affect actual jurors (Tanford &
Penrod, 1984) might in fact influence undergraduate subjects.
In addition to the target offense control group, single-offense control groups
for the second and third charge in each joined condition were included in the
design. The additional control groups served two purposes: (1) to examine joinder
effects on the other, nontarget charges, and thereby examine the generality of the
phenomenon, and (2) to investigate the magnitude of joinder effects as a function
of the position of the charge in the joined sequence, as opposed to the first charge
only.
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METHOD
Subjects. Subjects were 374 undergraduates at the University of Wisconsin
who received course credit for participation. The sample was two-thirds female
and one-third male, and subjects' mean age was 19 years.
Design. The design of the experiment is presented in Table 1. The study used
a 3 {charge similarity: identical, similar or dissimilar) x 2 {evidence similarity:
similar or dissimilar) x 2 instructions present or absent) between-subjects design.
Each of the 12 experimental (joined) groups contained the same offense (designated the tktarget offense") in combination with two other offenses that represented the experimental manipulations. In addition, 13 single-case control groups
were run, consisting of the target control group (which was the first charge in all
joined conditions), six single-case control groups corresponding to the second
charge in each joined condition, and six single-case control groups corresponding
to the third charge in each joined condition. The content of the control tapes was
identical to the content of the offense when presented in the joined trial.
The independent variables were defined as follows: Charge similarity was
defined as the type of crime and the circumstances surrounding the crime, where
identical charges were three service station burglaries, similar charges were three
burglaries committed at different establishments, and dissimilar charges were
burglary, assault and armed robbery charges. Evidence similarity was defined as
the main evidence presented in each case by the prosecution. For similar evidence
conditions the evidence for each charge was circumstantial evidence that the
defendant was seen driving suspiciously near the scene around the time of the
crime with no explanation for his whereabouts. For dissimilar evidence conditions
the main evidence was different for each charge.
Judges1 instructions were defined as special joinder instructions given by the
Table 1. Experimental Design0
Joined conditions
Charges

Single conditions
Target
control
group

Second charge
control groups

Evidence

Identical

Similar

Dissimilar

B.B, B, »

B, b, bi

3

B, A, R,

5

Similar

2

B, b2 b$

4

B, A2 R3

6

Dissimilar

B.B.B,7

B, b, bi

9

B^R,"

8

B, b 2 bi

,0

B, A2 R3 ,2

No instructions
6
5
B, 1 B 2 2 b , 3 b 2 4 A, A, Hi B 2 B 3

§?

Third charge
control groups
3
B, 1 B 3 2 bi bi

4

V

R3 6

k
a

B2 B3

Similar
[instructions
Dissimilar

Charge codes: B, burglary (service station); b, burglary (residence); b \ burglary (business); A,
assault; R, robbery. Evidence codes: 1, circumstantial evidence; 2, eyewitness identification; 3,
other evidence (fingerprints, informant, or stolen property).
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judge along with the regular jury instructions at the end of the trial. The instruction was an elaborated and strengthened version of the typical instruction given
in actual joined cases. The purpose of the instruction was to alleviate each of the
three hypothesized sources of prejudice from joinder. The instruction manipulation was presented by the trial judge as follows (the type of prejudice addressed
by each portion is indicated in parentheses):
1. The defendant is charged with three counts (of burglary—similar charge conditions)
(that is, with the counts of burglary, battery, and armed robbery—dissimilar charge
conditions). These are separate crimes and the prosecutor is charging that the defendant
committed all of them. The fact that the defendant is charged with more than one crime
is not evidence against him. (criminal inference)
2. Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. You
should treat the evidence from each charge as separate and distinct, (confusion)
3. It is for you to determine whether the defendant is guilty of one, two, three, or none
of the offenses charged. The fact that you may find the accused guilty or not guilty as
to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense
charged. In deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence on a particular charge, you
should consider the evidence pertaining to that charge only, and you should not consider
the evidence from the other two charges. Each count charges a separate crime, and you
must consider each one separately, (accumulation)

Stimulus Materials. The same videotaped trial reenactments employed by
Tanford and Penrod (1984) were used in the present study. The cases were
based on burglary, assault, and armed robbery cases tried in Wisconsin. Two
experienced trial attorneys served as the attorneys in the reenactments, and witnesses were student and staff volunteers. Each case was filmed individually at
the University of Wisconsin Law School courtroom. The joined conditions were
created by editing together combinations of three charges each, all of which
contained the same ''target'' offense (presented first) in combination with two
other charges (presented second and third), which represented the experimental
manipulations. The joined conditions were presented in the form a joined trial is
actually conducted (prosecution opening statements for each of the three charges,
defense opening statements, direct and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses for each charge, questioning of defense witnesses, prosecution closing
arguments, defense closing argument, judges' instructions). The target offense
presented as a single trial constituted the control group for the first charge in
each condition, and 12 additional single trial tapes served as controls for the
second and third charges (which were different in each condition). Joined trial
tapes lasted from IV2 to 2 hours, and single trials lasted from 30 to 45 minutes.
Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 25 experimental^
conditions, with 11 to 21 subjects per cell (mean n = 15). Subjects viewed the
trial videotape in small groups, and following the trial individually completed a
posttrial questionnaire which contained the dependent measures. Experimental
sessions lasted from 1 to 2V2 hours.
Dependent Measures. (1) Manipulation checks—Subjects in joined conditions rated the similarity of the three charges, as well as the evidence containedin the charges, on discrete scales from 1 (highly similar) and 9 (highly dissimilar).?
(2) Verdict—Subjects provided a dichotomous verdict preference (guilty or
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not guilty). From a legal standpoint, verdict is clearly the most important dependent variable.
(3) Certainty—Subjects rated the degree of certainty in their verdicts on a
scale from 1 (extremely uncertain) to 9 (extremely certain).
(4) Evidence recognition—Subjects were given a multiple choice recognition
task and were asked to choose which facts were contained in the target charge
from among (a) correct items actually contained in the target offense, (b) factual
errors about the target offense and (c) items from the other two nontarget charges
which were attributed to target offense witnesses ("intrusions"). These items
constituted a measure of confusion.
(5) Evidence ratings—Subjects were asked to rate the strength of the evidence for prosecution and defense overall on scales from 1 (very weak) to 9 (very
strong). Subjects were also asked to rate the incriminating value of four specific
items of evidence for the target charge, two for prosecution and two for defense,
on scales from 1 (strongly indicates innocence) to 9 (strongly indicates guilt). The
evidence ratings provided a measure of accumulation of evidence.
(6) Defendant ratings—Subjects were asked to rate the defendant on the
following eleven 9-point bipolar scales: honest-dishonest, dangerous-not dangerous, likeable-dislikeable, good-bad, sincere-insincere, believable-unbelievable, calm-nervous, moral-immoral, attractive-unattractive, future crime
likely-unlikely, a typical criminal-not a typical criminal. The direction of positive
and negative poles (1 or 9) was evenly balanced to avoid any response bias. The
purpose of these measures was to assess inferences about the defendant's disposition.

RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Manipulation Checks. Responses to the charge and evidence similarity ratings were analyzed in 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence similarity) x 2 (instructions) analyses of variance. For the charge similarity rating there was a main
effect for charge similarity, F(2,171) = 15.06, p < .001. The mean ratings for
identical, similar, and dissimilar charges were 3.33, 4.13, and 5.25, respectively,
where a smaller number indicates greater similarity. There was also a marginally
significant instruction effect for charge similarity ratings, F( 1,171) = 3.34, p =
.07. Subjects who did not receive the instruction manipulation rated the charges
as more similar (M = 4.0) than subjects with instructions (M = 4.46). For evidence similarity ratings, there was only a marginally significant effect for evidence
similarity, F{ 1,171) = 2.79, p = .10, which was rated as more similar in similar
(M = 4.07) than in dissimilar (M = 4.5) evidence conditions. There was also a
marginally significant charge similarity effect, F(2,171) = 2.79, p = .06, and a
marginal effect for instructions, F(l,171) = 3.26, p = .07. The mean evidence
similarity ratings in identical, similar and dissimilar charge conditions were 3.86,
4.44, and 4.47, respectively, and the mean ratings for no-instructions and instruc-
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tions conditions were 4.07 and 4.50. The manipulation checks indicate that the
charge similarity manipulation was successful, whereas the evidence similarity
manipulation was weak. Therefore, the predicted effects of similarity should hold
primarily for charge similarity, and not necessarily for evidence similarity.
Questionnaire Analyses
The effects of joinder on target offense judgments were assessed by comparing the target control group with the mean of the experimental groups using
planned contrasts (Keppel, 1982). In addition, target offense judgments in joined
conditions only were analyzed in 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence similarity)
x 2 (instructions) analyses of variance. All single-joined comparisons for which
the hypotheses were directional used one-tailed tests, and the remaining comparisons used two-tailed tests. In addition to analyses on the target offense (which
was identical in all conditions) supplemental analyses compared verdicts on the
second and third joined offenses with their single-case counterparts. For all analyses, effect sizes (Cohen, 1977) are reported along with significance tests. For /
tests, the correlation coefficient (r) served as the effect size measure, and for F
tests, the eta statistic provided a comparable measure.
Verdicts. Table 2 presents the proportion of guilty verdicts obtained on the
target charge in each cell. Analyses were performed on the proportion of guilty
verdicts obtained. Although analysis of dichotomous measures may be lower in
power than continuous measures, dichotomous measures are appropriate for analysis of variance and regression techniques (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In terms of
ecological validity, analyses of guilty-not guilty verdicts are clearly desirable.
Analyses on the proportions revealed no significant differences between
joined conditions and the control group, although in all but one cell the proportion
of guilty verdicts in joined, no-instructions conditions was higher than the proportion of guilty verdicts obtained in the Control group. The C x E x I analysis
of variance revealed a significant effect for instructions. F(l,192) = 4.93, p =
.03, eta = .16 with fewer guilty verdicts with instructions (M = .31) than without
(M = .46). This result is particularly interesting in light of the results obtained
by Tanford and Penrod (1984) in which the same instructions had no effect on
representative jurors' judgments.
Table 2. Proportion of Guilty Verdicts—Target Charge
Charges
Identical

Similar

Dissimilar

.53
(17)
.54
(13)

.57
(2i)
.4!
(17)

.20
(15)
.47
(17)

Similar

.29
(14)
.20
(15)

.41
(17)
.47
(15)

.15
(13)
.27
(11)

Similar

Evidence

Dissimilar

Dissimilar

No
instructions

Instructions
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Also unlike Tanford and Penrod (1984), there was a significant joinder effect
for certainty judgments in the present study, r(192) = 2.01, p = .05, r = .14.
Subjects in joined conditions expressed more certainty in their verdicts (M =
7.25 overall) than subjects in the control group (M = 6.55). There was also a
main effect for instructions in the C x E x / analysis of variance, F(l,192) =
10.42, p < 0.1, eta - 23, which indicated that subjects expressed less certainty
with instructions (M = 6.88) than without (M = 7.56). This suggests that subjects
were influenced by judges' instructions, and were as a result less confident that
their verdicts were correct.
Additional insight into the certainty results was obtained by examining subjects1 certainty as a function of their verdicts (along with the other manipulations)
in a 2 (verdict: guilty or not guilty) x 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence similarity) x 2 (instructions) analysis of variance. The instruction effect was again
significant, but was qualified by a verdict x instructions interaction, F (1,136) =
7.15 (p = .008, eta = .22. Subjects with guilty verdicts were equally certain with
(M = 7.52) and without (M = 7.41) instructions. However, subjects who voted
not guilty were less certain with instructions (M = 6.46) than without (M = 7.63).
The purpose of the instruction was to reduce convictions, and the obtained interaction suggests that this goal was accomplished at the expense of a loss in
subject confidence.
Table 3 compares the proportion of guilty verdicts obtained for the second
and third charges in joined instructions and no-instructions conditions with the
same offense judged as a single trial. Since the content of the charge was different
in each experimental condition, analyses were performed on each offense (row
of Table 3) individually. With one exception (row 4) there were more guilty verdicts on the second charge in joined than single conditions, particularly without
instructions, but only two of these differences were statistically significant. However, the analyses had low power due to small H'S of 13 to 21 subjects per cell.
The mean joinder effect size across the six cases was .22, indicating that the
Table 3. Proportion of Guilty Verdicts: Charges 2 and 3 Compared to Single Cases0
Joined

a
b

Single

Cell#

No instructions

Cell#

Instructions

.15"
.20"
.19°
.43°
.07°
.07°
.00°
.00°
.00°
.08*
.06°
.23*

1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6

.35"
.54*
.52*
.29"
.27°
.24"
.41*
.31*
.33*
.35*
.13"
.35"

7
8
9
10
11
12
7
8
9
10
11
12

.21"

fl's = 11 to 21 per cell.
For each row, means without common subscripts are significantly different at p < .05.

21a.b

.35°-*
.27°
.38"
.09*
.21"-*
.31*
.00*
.13**
.00*
.18*
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effect was moderate in magnitude (Cohen, 1977). The strongest joinder effects
were obtained for the third charge, particularly in identical and similar charge
conditions, in which all four joined no-instructions means were significantly
higher than their corresponding controls. In all cases the conviction rate was
higher in joined than single conditions, with a mean joinder effect size across the
six cases of .28. As was the case for charges 1 and 2, judges' instructions reduced
the conviction rate in joined conditions.
Although the present results suggest that joinder effects are stronger on later
charges (contrary to Bordens and Horowitz, 1983, and Horowitz et al., 1980), it
should be noted that each of the second and third charges was different, so that
charge type was confounded with charge position. Thus, the position effects may
have been due to the particular charges used, rather than position per se. The
more important finding is that joinder effects were obtained on a variety of different charges, demonstrating the phenomenon's generalizability.
Recognition Task. The recognition task required subjects to choose which
items were present in the target offense from among four correct items, four
incorrect items and eight false recognition items ("intrusions") from nontarget
offenses. Analysis of the recognition results was performed on the 12 experimental groups and the target control group only, because the task assessed recognition accuracy on target charge testimony. Overall, subjects were 92% accurate on the correct items, and made 11% factual errors by circling incorrect items.
Our primary concern was with intrusions or false recognitions of facts from other
cases. There were significantly more intrusions in joined conditions (M = 1.08)
than there were in the control group (M = .15), /(192) = 3.33, p = .001, r =
.23. The C x E x / analysis of variance yielded a main effect for charge similarity
F(2,191) = 7.57, p = .001, eta = .27, and a C x E interaction F(2,191) = 5.01,
p = .01, eta = .22. As predicted, the number of intrusions increased as a function
of charge similarity, with means of .79, .90, and 1.56 in dissimilar, similar and
identical charge conditions. The nature of the C x E interaction was examined
in an analysis of the simple effect of charge similarity for each level of evidence
similarity. There was no effect for charge similarity in dissimilar evidence conditions, F < 1, with means of 1.14, 1.26, and 1.29 for dissimilar, similar, and
identical charges. The charge similarity main effect was due to a very strong
effect for charge similarity in similar evidence conditons, F(2,94) = 13.13, p <
.001, eta - .41, with means of .43, .61, and 1.18 for dissimilar, similar, and
identical charges, respectively. The results for the recognition task are consistent
with those obtained by Tanford and Penrod (1984). Joinder led to some confusion of evidence among charges, confusion increased as a function of charge
similarity, and limiting instructions did not affect memory processes.
Evidence Ratings. Four measures of evidence strength were obtained for
each subject: (1) prosecution evidence strength overall, (2) defense evidence
strength overall, (3) prosecution item sum—the summed incriminating value of
two individual pieces of prosecution evidence for the target charge and (4) defense
item sum. For the prosecution overall rating, there was a significant joinder effect,
/(192) = 2.26, p = .01, r = .16. Subjects in all joined conditions rated the
prosecution evidence as stronger (M = 5.34) than subjects in the control group
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(M = 4.05). The C x E x /analysis of variance on the overall prosecution rating
yielded a significant charge similarity effect, F(2,191) = 3.94, p = .02, eta =
.20, with means of 4.62, 5.72, and 5.44 in dissimilar, similar, and identical conditions. There was also a significant joinder effect for the summed prosecution
items, f(192) = 2.15,/? = .02, r = .15. Subjects in joined conditions rated specific
items of prosecution evidence as more incriminating (M = 12.46), than subjects
in the control group (M = 10.8). The instruction manipulation did not affect either
prosecution evidence rating.
For the overall defense evidence rating, there were no main effects or interactions for any of the manipulations. For the summed defense items, the joinder
effect was not significant, but there was a significant main effect for charge similarity, F(2,190) = 8.02, p < .001, eta = .28 with means of 7.71, 9.51, and 8.03
in dissimilar, similar, and identical charge conditions. There was also a C x E
interaction, F(2,190) = 3.69, p < .05, eta = .19, for which the means in identical,
similar, and dissimilar charge conditions were 8.29, 10.03, and 7.00 with similar
evidence, and 7.75, 8.87, and 8.84 with dissimilar evidence.
Defendant Ratings. Subjects rated the defendant on eleven 9-point bipolar
scales on a number of traits and behaviors. Factor analysis on these ratings
yielded two factors. The first factor contained the items honest-dishonest, goodbad, moral-immoral, future crime likely-unlikely, believable-not believable,
sincere-insincere, a typical criminal-not a typical criminal, dangerous-not dangerous, and likeable-dislikeble. This can be considered a "criminality-credibility" factor. The second factor had strong positive loadings on the items nervous-calm, attractive-unattractive, and a moderate loading on likeable-dislikeable. This can be considered to be a "global evaluation" factor. For analysis
purposes, all items were scaled so that a higher number indicates a less favorable
rating.
Analyses on subjects' criminality factor scores revealed a significant joinder
effect, /(355) = 4.42, p = .001, r = .23. The defendant was rated less favorably
in joined (M = 28.64) than single (M = 26.64) trials. The C x E x / analysis of
variance yielded a significant main effect for charge similarity, F(2,355) = 4.72,
p = .01, eta = .16, and no other main effects or interactions. The defendant was
rated less favorably when charges were identical (M = 29.10) or similar (M =
30.48) than when charges were dissimilar (M = 25.99).
The same effects were obtained for the defendant evaluation factor, although
they were not as strong. Again, ratings in joined conditions were significantly
higher than the control condition ratings (M = 11.34), t(357) = 3.01, p = .002,
r = .16. There was a significant main effect for charge similarity on the defendant
evaluation factor, F(2,357) = 3.35, p = .04, eta = .11, which indicated that
subjects again rated the defendant less favorably when charges were identical (M
= 12.67) or similar (M = 12.77) than when they were dissimilar (M = 11.49).
Limiting instructions did not affect defendant evaluations, nor did evidence similarity, and there were no interactions among any of the manipulations.
Relationships Among Variables. Table 4 presents the correlations among the
main dependent measures: defendant criminality and evaluation scores, prosecution and defense overall evidence ratings, memory intrusions, and verdicts.
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Table 4. Correlations Among Dependent Measures
Criminality

Defendant evaluation
Prosecution evidence
Defense evidence
Memorv
Verdict
a

.68"
.56"
- .62"
.00
.56"

Evaluation
.41"
- .38"
.09
.42"

Prosecution

Defense

Memory

.60°
.03
.69"

-.00
-.63"

.01

p < .001.

With the exception of memory, all variables were strongly related to each other.
Unfavorable impressions of the defendant were positively related to perceptions
of prosecution evidence strength, and negatively related to defense evidence
strength. Impressions of the defendant were also positively related to verdicts.
Evidence strength was strongly related to verdicts, with a positive relationship
for prosecution evidence, and a negative relationship for defense evidence. In
previously reported results, the strongest joinder effects were obtained for defendant ratings, and in particular defendant criminality scores. Although correlational, the present results are consistent with the prediction that, to the extent
that joinder fosters a negative impression of the defendant, this impression affects
perceptions of the evidence and juror verdicts.

DISCUSSION
The present results extend the findings of previous research on joinder, and
provide further insight into decision making processes in multiple-offense trials.
With a few exceptions, the findings of Tanford and Penrod's (1984) study of
deliberating qualified jurors were replicated using nondeliberating undergraduates. Joinder tended to increased the proportion of guilty verdicts relative to
single-offense control groups: however, this difference was not significant for the
first joined charge, it was significant for two of six charges in the second position,
and four of six charges in the third position. The reasons for the weak effects (on
the first charge in particular) may have been due in part to low power in the
present study, since Tanford and Penrod (1984) obtained significant joinder effects on the same offense in a study that used larger sample sizes.
Because a number of studies have accumulated on joinder effects, a meaningful way to incorporate the present results with previous findings is to combine
the results statistically in the manner described by Rosenthal (1978). Table 5
presents a summary of previous and present results. For joinder effects obtained
in each study, a mean t value was computed, and a z score corresponding to the
exact probability for that value was provided. The mean joinder effect size for
each study was also computed. The significance of the overall joinder effect was
computed by adding weighted z's, and the resulting Z score of 4.48 was highly
significant at p = .0000035. Thus, although some of the joinder effects obtained
in the present study were weak, the pattern across all studies demonstrates that
the finding is a very robust one. Computation of a 'Tile-drawer statistic" (Ro-
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Table 5. Summary of Joinder Research Findings
Studv
Horowitz et al. (1980)
Greene & Loftus (1985)
Study 1
Study 2
Tanford & Penrod (1982)
Study 1
Study 2
Bordens & Horowitz (1983)
Tanford & Penrod (1984)
Present results
Charge 1
Charge 2
Charge 3
Sum
Mean
Weighted Z = 4.48, p = .0000035.

/

df

P

4.57

144

.0005

.36

3.30

3.14
2.74

58
130

.002
.004

.38
.23

2.90
2.65

2.68
1.64
3.32
2.75

80
64
54
722

.005
.05
.001
.005

.29
.20
.41
.10

2.58
1.67
3.12
2.58

.23
1.43
1.90
24.40
2.44

192
42
41
1527
153

.40
.08
.03
.5775
.0577

.02
.22
.28
2.49
.25

.26
1.41
1.89
22.36
2.24

r

z

senthal, 1979) revealed that 110 studies with null findings (z = 0.0) would be
required to bring the finding down to a barely significant probability of .05.
As noted above, the magnitude of joinder effects on verdicts in the present
study was influenced by the position of the charge in the joined sequence, with
stronger effects obtained for later charges. The position effects run counter to
the findings of Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980), who
found that joinder primarily increased convictions on the first, but not the second,
of two joined charges. Greene and Loftus (1985), on the other hand, found that
joinder increased convictions equally on charges presented first or second. Although there are some discrepancies among studies, the research demonstrates
that the effects of joinder are not limited to charges in a particular position. The
differences are likely due to the particular case materials and procedures used by
different researchers, and may be partially a function of case strength. In the
present study, charge position was confounded with the particular charges used,
because the complexity of the materials made it impractical to include every
charge in every position. The third charges were somewhat weaker than the first
two, so the findings support our earlier speculation that joinder effects are
stronger with weaker cases.
The conditions in which significant joinder effects were obtained were exclusively those involving three crimes of the same type, which were either "identical" (three service station burglaries) or similar (three burglaries at different
establishments). No significant effects were obtained in dissimilar charge conditions. This finding is consistent with the results of Bordens and Horowitz (1983),
who also obtained more convictions when similar charges were joined. The findings are also consistent with research on prior convictions, which demonstrates
that a prior conviction for a similar crime is more likely to work against the
defendant than is a conviction for a dissimilar crime (Sealy & Cornish, 1973;
Wissler & Saks, 1985).
Tanford and Penrod (1984) found that a strong and carefully designed set of
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of limiting instructions did not influence qualified jurors' judgments; however,
the same set of instructions did significantly reduce convictions in the present
study. This finding runs counter to previous joinder research (Greene & Loftus,
1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1982); and indeed, much of existing research in other
domains which indicates that limiting instructions tend to be ineffective (Lind,
1982). In the present study, every effort was made to design an effective manipulation by elaborating on the standard instruction, while other researchers generally present the standard instruction as is, or use an artificially derived instruction. The present results indicate that it is possible to design an instruction that
will have an effect, although it is important to note the limitations of its effectiveness. First, the instruction influenced undergraduates', but not representative
jurors' verdicts. Second, although the instruction did affect verdicts, it did not
influence memory, evidence strength ratings, or defendant ratings. Instructions
also reduced undergraduates' certainty in their verdicts; primarily when they
voted not guilty, suggesting that instructions influenced verdicts at the expense
of a loss of subjects' confidence in their decisions.
Support was obtained for each of the three processes hypothesized to operate
in joined trials. Joinder led to confusion of evidence, perceptions of stronger
prosecution evidence, and negative inferences about the defendant. As in previous research (Tanford and Penrod, 1982, 1984) confusion was unrelated to
verdicts. The single exception to this finding is the study by Bordens and
Horowitz (1983) in which memory intrusions were related to verdicts. The present
findings are consistent with research using other impression formation tasks,
which indicates that memory for specific items of information is not strongly
related to the overall impression of a stimulus (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben,
Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Riskey, 1979). Therefore, the bulk of existing research
supports the conclusion that confusion is not the key mediating factor in joinder.
On the other hand, evidence and defendant ratings were related to verdicts, as
well as to each other, consistent with the findings of Tanford and Penrod (1982,
1984). Bordens and Horowitz (1983) also found that evidence ratings were related
to guilt judgments, and Greene and Loftus (1985) found that defendant ratings
were related to guilt.
The present results are consistent with the prediction that joinder fosters an
unfavorable impression of the defendant, which influences perceptions of the
evidence as well as verdicts. Other joinder research supports this prediction as
well (Greene & Loftus, 1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1982, 1984), although the
correlational nature of the findings makes them susceptible to alternative explanations. However, the pattern of relationships obtained is consistent with research by Smith and Miller (1983) using a different impression formation task in
which it was possible to specify causal direction. Smith and Miller found that
inferences about an actor's disposition occurred prior to judgments about the
causes of an event, suggesting that these inferences mediated causal judgments.
Research in other jury situations demonstrates that the first information received
has a strong influence on jurors' judgment processes, providing further evidence
for the importance of initial impressions (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Mack & Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman,
1981).
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The existing research on joinder has significance with respect to the methodological issues involved in conducting jury simulation research (Bray & Kerr,
1981; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979; Lind & Walker, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979).
Although there are some discrepancies among studies, significant joinder effects
have been demonstrated in a wide variety of experimental settings under varying
degrees of realism. The magnitude of the effects varied somewhat among studies;
however, a statistical summary of the results of all studies indicated that the
joinder effect is a robust one.
The present research demonstrated that the same set of instructions that did
not influence the representative jurors in Tanford and Penrod's (1984) study
did affect undergraduates; otherwise deliberating jurors' and nondeliberating undergraduates'judgment processes were remarkably similar. Therefore the results
suggest that (1) results can be obtained under somewhat artificial laboratory conditions that have implications for more realistic settings but (2) we should nevertheless be cautious in generalizing our results.
With this in mind, we note the practical significance of the present findings.
The pervasiveness of joinder effects obtained in experimental settings (from very
artificial to very realistic) suggests that the problem is of sufficient magnitude to
warrant the attention of the courts. The courts intuitively recognize the potential
of prejudice from joinder, and the present research provides empirical evidence
as to the psychological processes that may result in prejudice. The law primarily
allows for joinder of similar offenses, although the present research indicates that
joinder of similar crimes may actually be more prejudicial than joinder of dissimilar crimes. The law also assumes that the traditional limiting instruction will
reduce prejudice from joinder, although research suggests that it will not (Greene
& Loftus, 1985). Although elaborated instructions did reduce convictions in the
present study, they did not with representative jurors (Tanford & Penrod,
1984). The present results are encouraging, since they demonstrate that it is
possible to design instructions that work. Future research efforts could be directed towards desiging limiting instructions that effectively reduce judgment
biases in the courtroom as well as the laboratory, perhaps by focusing on the
psychological mechanisms underlying juror prejudice.
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